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the	 island	 itself	 just	 takes	 a	 place	 in	 the	 very	midst	 of	 those	 above-mentioned	 struggles,	
disputes	 and	 the	 conflicts.	 Especially	 starting	 from	 the	WWI,	 the	 island	 occupies	 a	 very	
unusual	place	 both	 in	 the	 conflict	 of	 interest	 and	 the	 struggles	 of	 the	 island-centered	 and	
various	conflicts	surrounding	Cyprus,	and	in	addition	to	 the	Enosis	conflict	caused	by	the	
Greek	Cypriots,	the	efforts	for	the	annexation	of	the	island	to	Greece,	and	the	British	policy	
towards	Greece	all	 increase	 the	problems	more	and	more.	Considering	 the	position	of	 the	
island	especially	starting	from	April	1,	1955	on	which	Greek	Cypriot	terrorist	organization	
named	EOKA	started	terrorist	activities	not	only	against	British,	and	Turkish	Cypriots	but	




also	 established	 some	underground	organizations	 such	as	Volkan,	 9	Eylül	 (9th	September	
symbolizing	the	salvation	of	Nicosia	as	well	as	that	of	Izmir),	and	Türk	Mukavemet	Teşkilatı	
(Turkish	Resistance	Organization)	 but	 except	 the	 last	 one,	 all	 the	 efforts	 have	 come	 to	 an	
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Öz
	Kıbrıs	adası	tarih	boyunca	göçler	ve	sorunlar	adası	olarak	bilinmiştir.	Son	yüzyıla	
göz	 atıldığında	görülecektir	 ki	 savaşın	ve	mücadelelerin	dışındaymış	gibi	 görünse	de	 ada	
her	zaman	kendisini	çatışmaların,	savaşların	ve	mücadelelerin	tam	orta	yerinde	bulmuştur.	
Özellikle	 Birinci	 Dünya	 Savaşı’ndan	 başlayarak	 ada	 hem	 menfaat	 çatışmalarının	 hem	
de	ada	merkezli	başka	 çatışmaların	 tam	ortasında	yer	alır.	Ayrıca	Kıbrıslı	Rumların	adayı	
Yunanlaştırmaya	 yönelik	 Enosis	 girişimleri	 yanınnda	 İngilizlerin	 Yunanistan’a	 yönelik	
politikası	da	ada	etrafındaki	sorunları	kat	be	kat	artırır.	Adanın	durumunu	özellikle	1	Nisan	
1955	tarihinden	itibaren	başlayarak	sadece	İngilizlere	ve	Türklere	değil	kendilerine	yardımcı	
olmayan	 Rumlara	 yönelik	 de	 terör	 girişimlerine	 başlayan	 ve	 16	 Ağustos	 1960	 tarihinde	





destekli	 profesyonel	 EOKA	yapılanması	 karşısında	 başarısız	 olmuştur.	Öte	 yandan	Kıbrıs	
Cumhuriyeti	kurulmasına	rağmen	Kıbrıs	Türklerine	yönelik	Rum	saldırıları	devam	eder	ve	
cumhuriyet	 trajik	bir	olayla,	Kanlı	Noel	denilen	 süreçte	 sona	erer.	Kıbrıs	Cumhuriyeti’nin	


















that	 of	 immigration	 and	 the	 problems	 throughout	 the	 history.	 Starting	 from	
1	 	Robin	Parker,	Aphrodite’s Realm,	Nicosia,	1962,	p.	XXXIX.
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April	 1,	 1955,	 the	 rising	 EOKA	 organization	 and	 activities	 firstly	 against	 the	
British	subjects	on	the	island	and	then	against	Turkish	and	Greek	Cypriots,	who	
did	not	support	EOKA	activities,	caused	several	disruptions	in	communication	




Starting	 from	 1st	April	 1955	 up	 to	 1960,	 EOKA	 terrorist	 organization	
turned	the	island	of	Cyprus	into	a	bloody	spot,	and	the	life	on	the	island	became	
very	unbearable3	for	the	Turkish	community	as	well	as	the	Greek	Cypriots	and	
the	British	 communities.	On	 the	other	hand,	 at	 two	 conferences	held	 in	both	
London	 and	 Zurich,	 the	 Greek	 Prime	 Minister	 Constantine	 Karamanlis	 and	
Turkish	 Prime	Minister	 Adnan	Menderes	 negotiated	 a	 settlement	 of	 Cyprus	
issue,	consulting	Archbishop	Makarios,	and	Dr.	Fazıl	Küçük.	Finally	the	treaties	
were	signed	by	the	above-mentioned	leaders	and	by	the	British	Prime	Minister	
Harold	 Macmillan	 on	 February	 19,	 1959	 so	 as	 to	 establish	 an	 independent,	









2	 Charles	Foley,	Island in Revolt,	Longman	Yay.,	Londra,	s.180.	
3	 Charles	Foley,	The Memoirs of General Grivas,	Longman	Yay.,	Londra,	1964,	s.133.	Charles	Foley,	
Guerilla Warfare and  EOKA  Struggle; General Grivas ,	Longman	Yay.,	Londra,	1964,	s.	109.
4	 The	articles	of	the	treaty	were	also	supposed	to	be	very	original	and	unique,	not	copied	or	






again	 to	 the	main	point;	before	signing	 the	 treaty	 in	London,	Archbishop	Makarios	had,	
in	 reality,	 some	 certain	 reservations	 with	 regard	 to	 certain	 provisions	 contained	 in	 the	
agreements,	and	he	offered	some	grave	amendments	which	were	not	accepted.	Therefore	
he	was	 completely	 reluctant	 to	 sign	 the	 agreements.	Out	of	 the	discussions	and	debates	
here,	it	was	also	said	in	Cyprus	even	today	that	Makarios	was	forced	to	sign	the	agreements	
since	EOKA	leader	Georges	Grivas	threatened	him	showing	some	indecent	pictures	of	the	
archbishop,	 so	he	 seemed	 to	approve	 the	 treaties	a	 little	bit	unwillingly.	Clement	Dodd,	
Storm	Clouds	over	Cyprus;	A	Briefing,	Eothen	Huntingdon,	Cambridgeshire,	2002,	p.11.	
See	 also	 John	 Reddaway,	Burdened with Cyprus; The British Connection,	 Rustem	 Brothers	
Bookstore,	Nicosia,	2004,	p.124.		
5	 Byford	Jones,	Grivas and The Story of EOKA,	Robert	Hale	Limited	Yay.,	Londra,	1959,	s.14.										














For	 the	purpose	 of	 the	 local	 administration,	 the	five	major	 towns	of	Nicosia,	
Limassol,	Famagusta,	Larnaca,	and	Paphos	had	their	own	separate	Turkish	and	
Greek	Cypriot	municipalities	to	be	elected.	Thus,	a	Treaty	of	Guarantee	between	
Turkey,	Greece	and	Great	Britain	was	put	 into	 the	signature	so	as	 to	provide	
“the	 recognition	 and	 maintenance	 of	 the	 independence,	 territorial	 integrity,	
and	security	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	by	preventing	direct	or	indirect	Enosis	
or	Partition	or	 annexation	by	any	of	 the	 three	guarantor	 states”7.	Besides	 the	
guarantee	of	the	social	and	legitimate	situation	on	the	island,	a	Treaty	of	Alliance	











“The realization of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich 
and London Agreements. The glorious liberation struggle, whose fifth anniversary we 
celebrate today, has secured for us advanced bastions and impregnable strongholds for 
our independence. From these bastions we will continue the struggle to complete victory.” 
7	 Pierre	Oberling,	The Road to Bellapais,	Columbia	University	Press,	New	York,	1982,	p.66.	See	
also	PN	Vanesiz,	Cyprus;Crime without Punishment;	Regal	Printing	House,	Hong	Kong,	2000,	
p.70.	Friedrich	August,	Modern	Irregular	Warfare,	New	York,	1986,	s.92-102.
8	 Ulvi	Keser,	1955-1963 Kıbrıs’ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı,	IQ	Publications,	
Istanbul,	2007,	p.56-125.




Special	Committee	on	Cyprus	Affairs,	(Edited	by	Suat	Bilge)	“Cyprus; Past, Present, Future”, 
Ajans	Türk	Matbaası,	Ankara,	1963,	p.	9.	See	also	Pierre	Oberling,	ibid,	p.68.




there	 showed	 that	 the	 struggle	 for	Megali	 Idea	and	 for	 the	annexation	of	 the	
island	 to	 Greece	 would	 continue	 using	 all	 the	 possible	 means	 he	 has	 had.	
Similarly,	he	continued	to	threat	Turkish	Cypriots	and	cheer	the	Greek	Cypriots	
as	he	did	on	August	15,	196211;
“Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun 
by the EOKA heroes. The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we 
achieve our goal.”











and	his	 team	on	 the	 island	desired	 to	 do	was	 to	 present	 the	 situation	 to	 the	
United	Nations	and	argue	the	Zurich-London	Accords	claiming	that	the	accords	
had	never	been	submitted	for	approval	to	the	Cypriot	people,	and	the	principle	
of	 self-determination	which	can	be,	out	of	 the	ethnic	communities	 living	 in	a	
colonial	territory15,	a	noble	right	so	as	to	serve	the	highest	humanitarian	ideals	




headed	 for	 the	 pro-Third	World	 and	 pro-Soviet	 foreign	 policy.	Makarios	 by	








13	 N.	C.	Lanitis,	Our Destiny;A Consideration of Some Problems Pertaining to Cyprus,	Nicosia,	1963,	p.4.
14	 H.	Scott	Gibbons,	Peace Without Honor,	Ada	Publishing	House,	Ankara,	1969,	p.	7.	See	also	H.	
Scott	Gibbons,	The Genocide Files,	Charles	Bravos	Publishers,	London,	December	1997,	p.7–48.	












“The clandestine recruiting, training and organizing of the Greek Cypriot 
‘secret army’ began early in 1961. Although the EOKA organization of the 1955-1959 
campaign had been disbanded, many of its weapons had never been handed over to the 
Cyprus Police and the loyalties and obligations of its cells remained intact. These cells 
became the cadres of the new force. In 1962, in the Trodos Mountains under the guidance 
of the Greek Cypriot officer-cadets of the Cyprus Army and using arms ‘borrowed’ from 
government armories. By December 1963, there were up to 10.000 Greek Cypriots who 
had been recruited and trained to some extent.”
The	 activities	 led	 and	 assisted	 by	 the	 former	 EOKA	 organizations	
clandestinely,	Makarios’	ignorance	to	see	Turkish	Cypriots’	rights	in	the	country,	
unjust	and	unequal	behaviors	towards	Turkish	community	finally	cause	a	good	
many	 controversies,	 all	 of	which	were	 certainly	 resisted	by	Turkish	Cypriots	
too	 such	 as	 the	 security	 services	 controversy,	 the	Armed	Forces	 controversy,	
the	civil	service	controversy,	the	municipalities	controversy,	the	tax	controversy,	
the	 Constitutional	 Court	 controversy.	 Thus	 Makarios	 entrusting	 Polykarpos	
Yeorgadjis18,	 Tassos	 Papadopoulos	 and	 Glafkos	 Klerides	 to	 prepare	 a	 plan	
named	Akritas	Plan,	firstly	published	and	appeared	on	April	21,	1966	by	 the	




“…The plan was in fact a conspiracy to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus. It had 
three objectives; to get rid of the 1960 treaties so as to re-open the way to self-determination 
and eventual Enosis; to create the impression that the constitution was unworkable and 
then to amend it on this pretext so as to eliminate the powers it conferred on the Turks 
and to reduce them to the status of a politically impotent minority; and to suppress 
immediately and forcefully any Turkish reaction so as to create fait accompli before 
there could be any external intervention; if widespread clashed occurred, suppression 
of the Turkish Cypriots would be completed at once and would be accompanied by an 
immediate declaration of Enosis…”
17	 Pierre	Oberling,	ibid,	p.70.	See	also	Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	
CF,	780A.00/1-1663.Confidential,	January	16,	1963	Nicosia.
18	 Yeorgadjis	 have	 clandestinely	 established	 within	 the	 Civil	 Service	 and	 Police	 Forces;	
a	 sophisticated	network	 of	 EOKA	members,	 and	prepared	 them	 for	 the	 final	 atatcks	 on	
Turkish	Cypriots	on	November	21,	1963.		Zenon	Stavrinides,	The Cyprus Conflict;National, 
Identity and Statehood, Cyrep	Publications,	Nicosia,	1999,	p.4.
19	 John	Reddaway,	Ibid,	p.134.	
Bloody Christmas Of 1963 In Cyprus In The Light Of American...
255
ÇTTAD, XIII/26, (2013/Bahar)
1963 And In The Eve Of The Bloody Events
Deterioration	of	the	situation	on	the	island,	and	Greek	Cypriot	ignorance	
brought	the	island	to	a	new	ambiguity,	and	Turkey	expressed	its	concerns	about	
the	 hardening	 of	 positions	 by	Greek	 and	Turkish	Cypriots,	 and	warned	 that	
Turkey	would	 support	 the	 Turkish	Cypriots	 naturally	 as	 a	 guarantor	 state20. 
Declaration	made	by	Turkey	caused	some	problems	in	the	USA	as	well,	and	the	
Department	 of	 State	 (DOS)	 was	 concerned	 lest	 current	 dispute	 between	 the	
communities	on	the	island	develop	into	serious	conflict	between	hardened	and	
irreconcilable	positions,	realizing	that	such	conflict	could	afford	opportunities	
for	 expansion	 communist	 power	 in	 Cyprus,	 endanger	 Greek	 and	 Turkish	
governments	and	seriously	weaken	NATO.21	The	US	thought	that	no	inflexible	
constitutional	 provisions	 and	 the	 solutions	 imposed	 from	 abroad	 would	 be	
suitable	to	solve	the	issue	but	the	pragmatic	adjustments	of	relations	between	
the	communities,	and	the	US	was	very	ready	against	any	effort,	drawing	the	US	
into	 the	 dispute,	 and	 to	 politely	 but	 firmly	 reject.	 The	 US	 government	 then	
pointed	out	some	certain	aspects	for	the	involved	parties,	expressed	for	Nicosia	
to	 avoid	 indications	undue	US	 concern,	 and	 counsel	moderation	and	mutual	
adjustment	to	the	leaders	of	the	communities.	Some	warnings	were	expressed	
for	 Athens	 that	 at	 convenient	 opportunities,	 they	 should	 continue	 counsel	
Government	of	Greece	to	urge	Makarios	to	seek	solution	with	Dr.	Küçük,	and	









in	 communicating	 his	 views	 on	 Cyprus	 as	 well	 as	 American	 Ambassador’s	
words	in	Athens,	saying	“I	told	Averoff	we	do	not	wish	to	become	involved	in	















President	 Dr.	 Fazıl	 Küçük	 called	 American	 Ambassador	 to	make	 a	 courtesy	
visit,	 saying	 that	Turkish	Cypriots	during	 recent	 conversations	had	 sincerely	
tried	to	find	solution	within	Constitution,	by	agreeing	to	joint	boards	and	at	the	




Küçük	had	never	given	consent	 to	 the	abolishment	of	 separate	councils26.	On	
February	7,	1963,	American	Ambassador	in	Nicosia	telegrammed	his	capital	city	


























27	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
February	7,	1963,	Nicosia.
28	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
February	7,	1963,	Nicosia.
29	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
February	7,	1963,	Nicosia.
30	 Venhar	Keskin,	Besieged,Nicosia,	December	2004,	p.7.	












issue.	 Similarly	 Turkish	 Foreign	Minister	 Erkin’s	 attempt	 to	make	 a	meeting	
with	 Averoff	 	 in	 Istanbul	 or	 Alexandropolis	 in	 context	 of	 “gentleman’s	
agreement”	was	refused	by	Averoff	declaring	that	he	knew	of	no	such	agreement	
and	never	 replied	 to	Erkin’s	proposal33.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	ambassador’s	
concern	 in	 Turkey	 was	 worth	 paying	 attention,	 asking	 “Was	 Makarios	




reactions	 in	 Ankara,	 and	 the	 US	 ambassador	 in	 Ankara	 mentioned	 about	 a	






ambassador	 to	 Greece	 to	 Secretary	 of	 State	 was	 received	 with	 disturbing	





























information	 to	 inform	 the	 organization	 of	 a	 possible	 coup	 d’état	 against	 the	
Greek	government,	and	the	decision	of	a	coup	d’état	has	already	been	taken,	and	




solution,	 as	 in	 the	 past,	 but	 if	 Makarios	 should	 seek	 to	 force	 revision	 of	
constitution,	Greece	and	Cyprus	must	then	go	separate	ways.	Greece	has	always	
honored	 its	 signature	 and	will	 continue	 to	do	 so…”37	According	 to	Mr.	Fazıl	
Küçük	on	the	other	hand,	the	present	problem	about	the	municipality	started	
out	 as	 of	 minor	 importance	 and	 “has	 been	 blown	 up	 to	 unreasonable	
proportions”38.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Küçük’s	 evaluations	 upon	 the	 issue,	 Makarios	
himself	had	also	pessimism	over	the	possibility	of	a	compromise	solution	to	the	


































confused	 and	don’t	 know	what	 to	do	 and	how	 to	do	 before	monitoring	 and	 evaluating	
Makarios’	steps.	Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	
Confidential,	May	23,	1963	Washington	DC.
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Cyprus	 was	 thoroughly	 unacceptable	 for	 the	 US,	 and	 they	 declared	 it	 very	
frankly.	 June-July	 1963	 period	 was	 full	 of	 complicated	 and	 sophisticated	
happenings	 not	 only	 in	 Greece	 but	 also	 in	 Cyprus	 and	 Makarios	 was	 torn	
between	the	choices	which	he	was	unable	to	spot	the	right	and	the	correct	one,	
applying	 “the	 restatements	 of	 extreme	Greek	Cypriot	 revisionist	 demands”41 
Makarios	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 continued	 to	 provoke	 the	 Turkish	 Cypriots,	
forgetting	and	ignoring	their	political	and	sovereign	equality	as	well	as	the	US,	
the	 UK,	 and	 Turkey,	 making	 a	 speech	 on	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	
Guarantee.	 It	 was	 a	 clear	 and	 frank	 indication	 that	 Makarios	 tried	 to	 make	
mostly	use	of	all	the	advantages	he	has	had	as	Archbishop	and	as	the	President,	
but	 the	 society	 around	 was	 sick	 and	 tired	 of	 his	 threats	 and	 challenging	
explanations	deriving	Cyprus	into	a	bloody	hell	in	the	following	days.	The	US,	
apart	from	Makarios’	clandestine	and	open	activities,	dealt	with	the	problems	in	
Greece	 as	well,	 regarding	 the	 feasible	 and	proper	 level	 of	 the	Greek	defense	
effort	due	to	the	probable	availability	of	Greek	resources	and	NATO	assistance	
and	 of	 the	 competing	 needs	 of	 the	 growing	 Greek	 economy42.	 Greek	 Prime	
Minister	 Pipinelis	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 tried	 to	 solve	 some	 seen	 and	 unseen	
problems	with	 Turkey	 and	 recently	 he	 sent	 a	 proposal	 to	 Turkey	 for	 a	 joint	
consortium	about	the	fishing	right	in	the	Aegean	Sea,	territorial	waters,,	and	the	
continental	shelf	there,	wishing	“This	would	leave	plenty	of	time	for	Greece	and	















41	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
June	27,	1963	Nicosia.















demanded	 that	Greece	concentrate	on	 the	 internal	growth	out	of	 the	military	























Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	ambassador	pressed	Makarios	very	hard	to	continue	
the	direct	talks	with	Turkish	Cypriots,	Makarios	frustrated	everybody	around	
considering	 different	 ways	 of	 solution	 such	 as	 reference	 to	 the	 UN	 and	 to	
46	 	Greek	Minister	of	Coordination;	Papaligouras	on	the	other	hand,	showed	their	will	about	
the	 possibility	 of	 a	US	participation	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 grant	 in	 the	NATO	Greek	defense	
exercise	 in	 1964.	What	Greece	wanted	 to	do	was	 in	 fact	 to	 see	 the	USA	 in	 collaboration	



















On	October	 1,	 1963,	 at	 the	 18th	 session	 of	 the	UN	General	Assembly,	
Cypriot	Permanent	representative	Rossides	in	reply	to	Turkish	Foreign	Minister	
Erkin	said	that	Makarios’	current	behaviors	and	the	actions	didn’t	mean	that	the	
constitutional	 guarantees	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Cypriots	 were	 in	 question.	 Turkish	
Foreign	 Affairs	 Minister	 also,	 in	 turn,	 demanded	 that	 the	 agreements	 be	
thoroughly	and	solemnly	be	implemented	as	signed	by	three	guarantor	states,	
recognizing	the	equal	existence	of	the	two	communities	on	the	island.	According	
to	 Turkish	 minister,	 the	 municipalities	 question	 was	 not	 that	 of	 perpetual	
partition	 of	 the	 municipalities	 but	 just	 a	 question	 of	 good	 will	 and	 mutual	
confidence	as	expressed	“the	sooner	the	Greek	Cypriot	leaders	are	able	to	create	
the	necessary	degree	of	inter-communal	confidence,	the	sooner	the	partition	of	
municipalities	 can	 be	 ended,	 at	 which	 point	 no	 one	 could	 be	 happier	 than	
Turkey”50.	While	Turkey	presenting	such	a	branch	of	tree	to	Greece,	Makarios	
who	 had	 never	 been	 affected	 and	 influenced	 by	 anybody	 except	 for	Glafgos	
Clerides	a	little	appeared	again	on	the	stage,	and	it	was	clear	that	no	individual	






to	 US	 role	 in	 Cyprus	 in	 influencing	 the	 communities	 on	 the	 island	 and	 the	
guarantor	states,	meanwhile	the	US	embassy	in	Turkey	is	at	nerve,	regarding	
“Turkish	popular	reaction	to	any	change	affecting	Turkish	minority	in	a	volcanic	
way”51.	 To	 do	 so,	 the	 US	 government	 prepared	 a	 detailed	 plan	 to	 lessen	


















Turkish	 differences	 through	 cooperation	 in	 Cyprus	 and	 its	 economic	
development.	 The	first	 priority	 for	 the	US	 seemed	 to	 urge	 the	UK	 to	 call	 on	
Greece	and	Turkey	 to	agree	on	a	 three-power	approach	 to	Makarios	and	Dr.	
Küçük	with	an	assurance	of	US	support,	and	the	necessity	of	the	leaders	on	the	
island	 to	 reaffirm	 support	 of	 the	 London-Zurich	 agreement	 and	 the	 Cyprus	
Constitution,	some	amendments	subject	to	change	in	the	agreements	signed	in	
1959	if	necessary.	The	principal	changes	presented	and	demanded	by	Makarios	













Venizelos;	 Deputy	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 Foreign	 Minister	 of	 Greece	 were	 in	




before	 forming	 the	present	government.	Venizelos	also	expressed	 that	all	 the	
members	of	the	new	cabinet	in	Athens	were	pro-West	and	great	friends	of	the	
USA53.	On	the	other	hand,	the	only	external	question	on	which	the	newly-elected	
government	 would	 differ	 with	 the	 previous	 Caramanlis	 government	 was	
Cyprus.	According	to	Venizelos,	as	Makarios	also	requested	and	demanded,	so	
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concern	would	be	 to	eliminate	 from	the	Cyprus	Constitution	 those	parts	 that	





and	contrary	 to	 the	 stories	of	desire	 to	prepare	 the	 island	 for	 the	union	with	
Greece,	the	offers	and	the	proposals	were	all	intended	to	make	the	island	more	
livable	for	the	people	there.	It	was	also	announced	there	by	Venizelos	that	his	
government	would	 be	 very	 glad	 and	 content	 to	 see	 not	 Cyprus	 as	 a	 part	 of	






a	memorandum	prepared	by	Makarios	was	delivered	 to	 the	 involved	parties	
including	 the	 US	 embassy	 in	 Nicosia,	 named	 “Suggested	 Measures	 for	
Facilitating	the	Smooth	Functioning	of	the	State	and	for	the	Removal	of	Certain	







the	Greek	 delegation,	 the	 British	 party	 viewed	 the	 issue	with	 sympathy	 and	
understanding,	 and	 the	 USA	 government	 was	 also	 expected	 to	 do	 so.	 For	
Venizelos,	 Makarios	 was	 ready	 to	 make	 concessions	 beyond	 the	 Cyprus	
Constitution,	 and	 the	 vice-president	 (Dr.	 Fazıl	 Küçük)	 rather	 than	 the	Greek	
Speaker	of	 the	House	 should	act	 in	his	 stead	when	 the	President	was	absent	
from	the	country.	Greek	ignorance	upon	Turkish	existence,	and	constitutional	
rights	 on	 the	 island	was	 responded	by	 the	US	party	 that	 anything	would	be	
accomplished	by	negotiation	and	agreement.	A	few	days	later	it	was	clear	that	
Turkish	 government	 would	 declare	 Turkish	 decision	 rejecting	 the	 plan	
completely,	and	regarding	the	Cyprus	question	stiffening.	Turkish	position	was	
supposed	 to	 be	 very	disappointing	 for	 the	US	 since	 Foreign	Affairs	Minister	












Washington	 DC,	 inviting	 Turkish	 Ambassador	 Turgut	 Menemencioğlu,	 and	
Counselor	 of	 Turkish	 Embassy	 İlter	 Türkmen.	Menemencioğlu	 there	made	 a	
talk	and	mentioned	on	the	current	situation	in	Cyprus	“by	tracing	recent	events	
revolving	 around	 the	 amendments	made	by	Makarios,	which	were	 regarded	
“negative,	unworkable	and	unjust”58	by	the	Greek	Cypriots,	and	he	tied	this	to	
the	Cyprus	crisis	of	the	1950’s	which	he	explained	in	terms	of	Greek	and	Turkish	
public	 opinion	 developing	 extreme	 opinions	 and	 dragging	 their	 respective	
government	 into	similar	positions”59,	 showing	that	Turkey	wanted	to	avoid	a	
repetition	of	 this	now	again	upon	the	heart	of	 life-and-death	issues	 involving	
Turkish	Cypriots60.	 	Makarios	was	mistaken	and	he	 failed	 to	understand	 that	
any	Turkish	government	would	have	clearly	the	same	reaction	and	the	objection	
as	the	Inonu	government	did61.	Turkish	Foreign	Minister	Feridun	Cemal	Erkin,	
on	 the	other	hand,	made	an	additional	 explanation	 in	Paris	on	December	15,	
1963	 that	 Makarios’	 proposals	 to	 amend	 Cyprus	 Constitution	 were	 highly	
unsatisfactory62.	Erkin	also	warned	that	if	Makarios	did	not	continue	to	respect	
Constitution,	 Turkey	might	 find	 it	 necessary	 to	 request	 guarantor	 powers	 to	
interfere	 with	 Cyprus,	 either	 individually	 or	 collectively.	 Unlike	 Venizelos’	
opinions,	Erkin	announced	that	Makarios’	proposals	were	designed	to	destroy	







59	 Memorandum	 of	 Conversation;	 DOS,	 CF,	 POL	 Cyp.	 Confidential,	 December	 12,	 1963	
Washington	DC.
60	 One	 of	 the	 hesitation	 as	 well	 as	 the	 army	 and	 the	 police	 presented	 and	 restrained	 by	
Turkish	party	was	the	veto	power,	and	it	was	particularly	very	important	and	necessary	





















“the	 US	 had	 already	 enough	 problems	 on	 its	 agenda	without	 taking	 on	 the	
Cyprus	dispute”64.	The	NATO	Ministerial	Meeting	held	in	London	on	December	
18-19	tuned	to	be	a	good	chance	and	opportunity	for	the	ministers	involved	to	
negotiate	 the	 issue	 in	detail.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	proposals	made	 there	 to	
solve	the	issue	“once	and	for	all”	seemed	to	be	illogical	and	unacceptable	for	the	
Turkish	party65;
“To solve Cyprus problem once and for all, one of two possible alternatives 
indicated; 1) union with Greece or 2) independence within British Commonwealth 
cutting alliance with Greece and Turkey. Greek and Turkish alliances were merely 
sources of friction. Troops maintained in Cyprus cannot defend the country and can 
only turn possible internal conflicts into broader ones. Greek and Turkish forces should 






“speak softly and carry a big stick”66.
Bloody Christmas Butchery And Cyprus On December 1963

















Greek	Cypriot,	 the	 issue	 should	 be	 solved	 and	 decided	 by	 “democratic	means.”	 British	
Minister	 frankly	 and	openly	 expresses	 that	 the	majority	 of	 the	population	on	 the	 island	













then.	 According	 to	 the	 report	 announced	 by	 Secretary	 General	 of	 the	 UN	
dated	September	10,	1964,	109	evacuated	Turkish	villages	were	damaged	with	
507	Turkish	houses,	more	than	2000	houses	were	seriously	demolished,	some	





Turkish	Cypriot	 leaders	 around	 a	 circle	 table	“with the aim of restraining both 
the police and Turkish rioters in the aftermath of violent clashes”68 	 between	 the	
communities	resulting	five	deaths	at	once.	According	to	Dr.	Küçük	who	was	very	
pessimistic	after	such	atrocity	in	Nicosia,	describing	the	events	as	a	new	step	for	





















68	 Telegram	 from	 the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;DOS,	CF,	POL	25	Cyp.	Confidential,	
December	22,	1963	Nicosia.
69	 Fatma	 Demirel,	 Never	 Again,	 TRNC	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	 Defence;Public	
Relations	Department,	Nicosia,	p.6.
Bloody Christmas Of 1963 In Cyprus In The Light Of American...
267
ÇTTAD, XIII/26, (2013/Bahar)
republic	 in	 this	way70.	On	December	 23,	 1963,	 the	US	 ambassador	 in	Ankara	
was	asked	to	visit	Turkish	Foreign	Minister	Erkin,	and	Erkin	told	him	that	he	
had	made	very	 fruitful	 negotiations	with	Venizelos	 in	Paris	 on	December	 20	






held	responsible	 for	 the	violence	caused	by	 the	ex-EOKA	militias71.	 It	 is	once	
more	worth	underlining	here	that	the	US	didn’t	believe	the	hostilities	occurred	
in	 Cyprus	 were	 not	 planned	 by	 either	 side,	 declaring	 “…that	 leadership	 of	
both	 communities	 making	 genuine	 effort	 to	 halt	 fighting,	 and	 that	 armed	
underground	organizations	in	both	communities	are	out	of	control.	Extremists	
on	both	sides	accuse	leadership	of	other	side	of	plotting	attacks”72.	Meanwhile	







make	 an	 operation	 on	 the	 island.	 Successively	Turkish	NATO	 representative	
on	December	25,	1963	made	a	 long	speech	paying	attention	 to	especially	 two	
important	points	of	Turkish	community	in	danger	of	massacre	by	Greek	Cypriots	






units75.	 That	 offered	 seemed	 to	be	baloney	 and	not	 accepted	by	 the	 involved	
parties	at	all.	Makarios’	and	his	government’s	request	for	a	UN	Security	Council	






73	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	 the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	POL	25	Cyp.	Confidential,	
December	24,	1963	Washington	DC.








Turkish	 government	 declared	 that	 Makarios’	 first	 and	 real	 purpose	 was	 to	
make	 life	so	unbearable	on	 the	 island	for	Turks	 that	 they	would	be	 forced	 to	
leave	Cyprus	 so	 as	 to	make	Cyprus	 a	Greek	 island	 for	Greece.	On	 the	 other	
hand	 the	US	embassy	 thought	 that	Turkish	Cypriots	would	accept	and	settle	
for	 autonomy	with	more	 effective	guarantees	 such	as	 larger	Turkish	military	
contingent	in	Cyprus.		
Conclusion
Because	 all	 the	Greek	 efforts	 to	make	 the	 island	 a	Greek	one	 starting	
from	mainly	1950s	came	to	an	end	with	failure	in	the	United	Nations	Security	
Council,	and	the	result	of	the	plebicite	was	also	invalid	to	accept	the	island	as	
a	Greek	one,	Greece	had	only	one	 solution	 for	 themselves,	 that	 is	 the	 armed	
struggle	against	Turkish	Cypriots.	Then	what	we	came	face	to	face	on	the	island	




of	 the	 island,	 loss	of	 innocent	 lives,	 tears,	 and	 the	 innocent	blood.	Under	 the	
guarantee	of	the	United	Kingdom,	Turkey	and	Greece,	the	bloody	spot	position	
of	the	island	got	wanted	to	be	changed	and	on	August	16,	1960,	the	Republic	












island,	 and	naturally	 such	 a	 republic	 having	 such	 bloody-handed	persons	 in	
charge	could	last	no	longer,	and	it	didn’t.	Makarios	himself	was	very	confident	




continue.	 Such	 an	 archbishop	 and	 the	 president	was	 surely	 unable	 to	 follow	
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